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Compulsory Licensing and the South African
Medicine Act of 1997: Violation or
Compliance of the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement?
I. INTRODUCTION
The compulsory licensing provisions of South Africa's Medicines and
Related Substances Control Act (Medicine Act) and South African Medicines
and Medical Devices Regulatory Act (SAMMDRA) comply with the Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) under two rationales.
First, given the economic conditions in South Africa, and its rate of AIDS
infections, the country cannot afford to wait for AIDS drug patents to expire.
The South African laws will comply with TRIPs when: (1) South Africa de-
clares the AIDS crisis a national emergency; and (2) the legislature rewrites
the laws to reflect generic versions of patented AIDS drugs be used in times of
national emergencies or when the medicine is necessary to protect human life.
Second, under a broad interpretation of TRIPs, the South African laws could
remain as written and still comply with TRIPs.
In 1997, South Africa amended the Medicine Act.' Article 15 gives the
government the right to allow parallel importing,2 which is the importation of
cheaper generic versions of patented drugs from countries that do not comply
with international patent agreements, namely TRIPs.3 The Medicine Act also
gives the South African Minister of Health the right to grant licenses allowing
local drug manufacturers to produce patented drugs at a fraction of the patent
owner's price.4 The government may require the drug manufacturer to pay the
patent holder a royalty in exchange for the right to duplicate the medicine.
5
This practice is known as compulsory licensing. 6 In 1998, the South African
government passed SAMMDRA. 7 The legislature enacted SAMMDRA in-
tending to repeal Article 15 of the Medicine Act. 8 The compulsory licensing
provision, however, withstood the enactment of SAMMDRA. 9
1. Kathy Chenault, John Carey & Paul Magnusson, Will The AIDS Plague Change U.S.
Trade Policy?, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 13, 1999, at 58.
2. Id.; See also Article 15C of Medicines and Related Substances Amendment Act No. 90
of 1997, 1997 SA HEALTH 90 [hereinafter Medicine Act of 1997].




7. Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers Association, Issues & Policy, Priority Foreign
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The pharmaceutical industry is in an uproar over the Medicine Act be-
cause of its alleged threat to international patent law.10 Multinational drug
companies are concerned that the Medicine Act violates TRIPs,I which is an
extension of the World Trade Organization Agreement. 12 South Africa has
halted implementation of the Medicine Act for fear of trade sanctions. 13 The
United States Trade Representative legitimized South Africa's fears by placing
South Africa on its "301 Watch List"'14 of countries that fail to obey interna-
tional patent rights.
AIDS activists have staged various demonstrations to protest against the
United States' opposition to the Medicine Act.15 In light of his seat on the
United States/South African bi-national commission, former Vice President
Gore has been under attack for his advocacy on behalf of the pharmaceutical
industry. 16 AIDS activists have further scrutinized the former Vice President
because the pharmaceutical industry donated millions of dollars to his presi-
dential campaign. 17 In September 1999, South African President Thabo
Mbeki came to the United States with the intention of reaching an agreement
on trade policy between the two countries. 18 On September 16, 1999, the
United States and South Africa reached a tentative agreement requiring the
United States to cease threatened trade sanctions and make AIDS drugs more
affordable to South Africans in exchange for South Africa's compliance with
TRIPs.19
South Africa is a low income Third World nation and has one of the
highest HIV infection rates in the world.20 There are specific provisions in
10. Chenault, supra note 1.
11. PhRMA News Release, PhRMA Supports USTR On South Africa, Apr. 30, 1999, avail-
able at http://www.phrma.org/news/4-30-99s.html.
12. Professor Michael Blakeney, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE TRIPs AGREEMENT 8 (1996).
13. Chenault, supra note 1, at 58.
14. See supra note 11, at 1.
15. In the United States, the activist group is called ACT UP. Bob Davis, Campaign Woes
Prompt Gore to Push For AIDS Drugs Deal with Pretoria, WALL ST. J. (Europe), Aug. 12,
1999, available at 1999 WL-WSJE 18411333.
16. See id.
17. White House Chief of Staff John Podesta and his brother Anthony, top lobbyists for the
pharmaceutical industry, are an integral part of the pharmaceutical industry's movement against
the Medicine Act and SAMMDRA. See Ed Vulliamy, How Drug Giants Let Millions Die of
AIDS, THE OBSERVER, Dec. 19, 1999, at http://www.accessmed-msf.org/msf/accessmed/access
med2.nsf/iwplist4/4cccal 73Fab3594c 1256871003e8bd?opendocument&style=content-level_2.
18. Chenault, supra note 1, at 58.
19. Steven Lee Myers, South Africa And U.S. End Dispute Over Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
18, 1999, at A8.
20. The World Health Organization and United Nations' joint effort entitled AIDS EPI-
DEMIC UPDATE Report of 1998 stated that seventy percent of the HIV-infected people in the
world are from Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, it reported that South Africa accounted for one
out of seven of these infections; see UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS,
AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE: DECEMBER 1998, at 3.
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TRIPs2 ' that validate South Africa's compulsory licensing of AIDS drugs.
Part I of this Note explains those provisions and their relation to the Medicine
Act.
Part II of this Note explains the TRIPs agreement. In addition, Part II
briefly compares international intellectual property restrictions under TRIPs
and the Paris Convention. This section also analyzes pharmaceutical patent
protection under TRIPs. Further, Part II explains compulsory licensing under
TRIPs, emphasizing the national emergency exception.
Part III discusses South Africa's medical patent laws and the effect of the
AIDS crisis on South Africa. Additionally, this section briefly outlines simi-
larities between South African and U.S. patent law.
Part IV details international opposition to the Medicine Act, specifically
by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations of the United States and
South Africa. Part IV also outlines specific provisions in the TRIPs agreement
rendering the Medicine Act valid. Further, Part IV gives a brief synopsis of
South Africa's constitutional right to declare its AIDS crisis a national
emergency.
II. TRIPs AND COMPULSORY LICENSING
A. History of International Patent Law
Patent legislation has gone through many changes.22 Venice Patent Law
of 1474 is the earliest recorded patent law2 3 enacted in response to a need for
talented inventors. 24 The governing body imposed time limits on patents,
which were also subject to state compulsory licenses.
2 5
Later, English legislators enacted the Statute of Monopolies in 1623.26
This law banned all monopolies except those granted by the issuance of pat-
ents. 27 English legislators granted patents under the Statute of Monopolies for
fourteen years, and placed price restrictions on the patents as well. 28
The French instituted a patent law in 1791 that was very similar to the
English legislation. 29 The law required patent holders to fill out affidavits
21. Articles 31, 27.1, 8.1 of TRIPs allow compulsory licensing under special circumstances,
discussed further in the Note.
22. For an in depth explanation, see BANKOLE SODIPO, CENTRE FOR COMMERCIAL LAW
STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, PIRACY AND COUNTERFEITING GATT TRIPS AND DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES, ch. 1 (1997).
23. See id. at 18.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 19.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 20.
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ensuring that their inventions were useful and would be "worked". 30 The
United States passed its first patent law in 1790.31
All of the above-mentioned countries passed these patent laws to maxi-
mize the level of innovation and protect inventions from piracy in a world that
was experiencing an industrial revolution.32 These countries, however, limited
patent legislation to their own national borders, so international compliance
was neither required nor regulated.33
The first international patent agreement was established in the Paris Con-
vention of 1883. 34 The Convention included a provision providing any mem-
ber of the Convention with a right of priority regarding registration of the
intellectual property rights in another member's boundaries. 35 Since its incep-
tion, the Paris Convention has been revised six times.36
The first mention of compulsory licensing in the Paris Convention took
place at the 1925 Revision Conference of the Hague (Hague Convention). 37
Article 5 of the Hague Convention laid the foundation that permitted compul-
sory licensing to force patentees to "work" their patented inventions. 38 Article
5 also stated that failure to work the patent could not result in forfeiture unless
compulsory licensing was an inefficient remedy. 39 Therefore, compulsory li-
censing replaced forfeiture as the favored remedy to deter abuse by the
patentee.
The Paris Convention of 1967 used phraseology similar to the 1925
Hague Convention with respect to its grant of compulsory licensing. 40 The
1967 Convention stated that compulsory licenses were granted "to prevent
abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred
by the patent, for example failure to work. '41 Failure to work is a limitation
on inactive use of the invention by the patentee. 42 The failure to work provi-
sion under Article 5 of the 1967 Convention limits the failure to use a patented
invention it to four years from the date of application, or three years from the
member's grant of the patent.43 Compulsory licensing was acceptable under




33. Id. at 21.
34. Michael Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements and Com-
pulsory Licenses at International Law, 35 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 243, 252 (1997).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 253.
37. Id. at 266.
38. Id. at 267.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, art. 5(A)(2),
21 U.S.T. 1583.
42. Halewood, supra note 34, at 245.
43. Blakeney, supra note 12, at 89.
44. Id.
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tion with respect to compulsory licensing because it also includes a forfeiture
clause.
45
The Paris Convention is flawed in its approach to international intellec-
tual property. For instance, member nations are not accountable for patents in
certain industries, specifically pharmaceuticals and chemical substances.
46
This gave member nations the right to copy pharmaceuticals without any
threat of legal action by the patentee. 47 Moreover, under the Paris Convention,
international patents had no term limits. 48 Therefore, under the Paris Conven-
tion, if a patent is registered in country A, and country B wants to use the same
invention, country B could start copying country A's invention after country
B's time limit on patented inventions expired.49 This non-uniformity gave rise
to copying at different times all over the world. Another flaw of the Paris
Convention is that compulsory licensees were not required to pay reasonable
fees to the patentee for use of the invention.
50
The Paris Convention's inability to effectively regulate international pat-
ents resulted in treatment of the Paris Convention's shortcomings as a trade
issue.5 ' For example, Section 301 of the U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988, allows the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to place
non-conforming trade partners on a watch list, and threaten to halt trade if said
countries fail to comply with United States' intellectual property law. 52 This
watch list seems to be an alternate method of combating international piracy.
45. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 41, art. 5(A)(3).




50. Id. at 23.
51. Id.
52. Section 301 dates back to The Trade Act of 1974. Section 301(a) states: "[Tihe United
States Trade Representative determines under section 304(a)(1) that (A) the rights of the United
States under any trade agreement are being denied (B) an act, policy or practice of a foreign
country - (i) violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to
the United States under, any trade agreement, or (ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts
United States commerce."; Section 301(c) lays out the actions the United States Trade Repre-
sentative can take to remedy such actions, namely: "suspend, withdraw, or prevent the applica-
tion of, benefits of trade agreement concessions... impose duties or other import restrictions on
the goods of, and ... fees or restrictions on the services of, such foreign country for such time
as the Trade Representative determines appropriate." See id. at 23; See also 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411 (a)(1).
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B. TRIPs
The practice of using trade to regulate intellectual property infringement
was instrumental in the creation of the TRIPs agreement. 53 Indeed, the organi-
zation that established TRIPs is the World Trade Organization (WTO),
54
which the United Nations Organization established during the Uruguay Round
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 55 The United States
suggested that the GATT be the controlling body to regulate intellectual prop-
erty. 56 This line of reasoning stirred controversy, because the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization (WIPO) was already in existence.
57
TRIPs is an extension of the WTO agreement. 58 Article IV of the WTO
agreement established a Council for TRIPs, whose main functions are moni-
toring international compliance with TRIPs and providing counsel to settle
disputes between WTO members.
59
1. Patents and TRIPs
TRIPs introduced patent regulations that are more stringent than anything
provided in the Paris Convention. As outlined above, under the Paris Conven-
tion there was a lack of uniformity regarding a minimum term for patented
inventions.6° TRIPs revolutionized international patents by assigning a uni-
versal term of twenty years from the filing date.61 Moreover, before TRIPs
came into existence many countries did not offer patent protection for
pharmaceuticals and other inventions.
62
TRIPs provides a remedy for the absence of protection of pharmaceuti-
cals. Article 27.1 provides that "patents shall be available for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.
' '63
TRIPs does, however, give developing countries the right to extend their dis-
criminatory practices regarding pharmaceutical patents for five years from the
date of the particular country's entrance into the WTO agreement. 64
53. The United States, which has a history of using Section 301 of the Omnibus Act to
pressure countries that do not respect American patents, suggested that the GATT govern the
regulation of international intellectual property.
54. Blakeney, supra note 12, at 22.
55. Id. at 29.
56. Id. at 3.
57. Id. at 4.
58. Id. at 8.
59. Id.
60. Sodipo, supra note 22.
61. Id. at 24.
62. Id. at 199.
63. Article 27 (1) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, An-
nex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPs] also available at http://www.wto.org.
64. Sodipo, supra note 22, at 200.
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A developing country can also extend the term to nine years by ignoring
the application until the five-year period commences, since it usually takes
approximately four years for a patent application to receive a grant. 65 In fact,
India, a nation known for its lax attitude towards pharmaceutical patents,
66
proposed a bill that provides that pharmaceutical patent applications will not
be reviewed until December 31, 2004.67 This continuing practice of patent
discrimination gives developing countries the freedom to ignore international
pharmaceutical patents.
2. Compulsory Licensing under TRIPs
A compulsory license is a governmental grant given to a local manufac-
turer to produce a patented invention without the permission of the patent
holder, who is, however, entitled to commensurate payment.68 The TRIPs
limitations on compulsory licensing are much narrower than those of the Paris
Convention. 69 Article 5A of the Paris Convention governs compulsory licens-
ing. Its original function was to prevent inactivity by patent holders. 70 A
1975 study by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) noted that developing countries were not using Article 5A to grant
compulsory licenses because of the four year waiting period and its
complexity.
7'
The WTO instituted TRIPs to simplify international compulsory licensing
requirements. 72 In TRIPs, Article 31 governs compulsory licensing. 73 Article
31 provides no limitations on the grounds for granting compulsory licenses,
but it omits the "failure to work" provisions integral to Hague and the Paris
Conventions.
74
TRIPs requires that any alternative use of a patent "shall be considered on
its own individual merits."'75 TRIPs allows compulsory licensing only if the
party has applied for permission from the patent holder under "reasonable
commercial terms and conditions" and is unable to receive it within a reasona-
ble time period. 7
6
65. Id.
66. The Indian Patents Act of 1970 does not provide adequate protection for pharmaceuti-
cals. The Effect of TRIPs on Indian Patent Law: A Pharmaceutical Perspective, I B.U.J. Sci. &
TECH. L. 4, at 14; See also Sodipo, supra note 22, at 200, n.41.
67. Sodipo, supra note 22, at 200, n.41.
68. Halewood, supra note 34, at 260.
69. TRIPs contains several articles that address compulsory licensing as opposed to the
Paris Convention's lone Article 5. See supra notes 41, 63.
70. Id.
71. Blakeney, supra note 12, at 89.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 90.
74. Id.
75. Article 31(a) of TRIPs states: "authorization of such use shall be considered on its own
individual merits."
76. TRIPs, supra note 63, art. 31(b).
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The application requirement is waived, however, in the case of a "na-
tional emergency, or other circumstances of emergency. ' 77 The United States
originally suggested the national emergency exception in Article 27 of the
United States' draft text. 78 The application requirement is also waived in
cases of public non-commercial use. 79 This provision is ordinarily used for
public health or national defense. 80 Article 31 also requires the government in
question to inform the patent holder immediately after using the invention for
a public non-commercial use. 8' Furthermore, Article 3 1(c) limits the scope of
the license to the purpose for which it is applied. 82 Compulsory licenses are
subject to termination "if and when the circumstances which led to it cease to
exist and are unlikely to recur. "83 This provision is TRIPs' method of protect-
ing against abuse of compulsory licenses.
III. SOUTH AFRICAN PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW AND THE
AIDS CRISIS
A. South African Medical Patent Law
1. Medicine Act of 1997
The Medicines and Related Substances Control Act of 1965 was the first
in a line of several medical-related patent laws bearing the same name. 84 The
Medicine Act of 1997 repealed all earlier versions and, as such, it is the focus
of this note. 8
5
The insertion of Article 15C is the main source of controversy. South
African legislators inserted this Article to follow Article 15B in the earlier
versions. The aim of this Article is to promote affordable medicines to the
South African public.86 This is truly a broad definition of power. The South
African Minister of Health governs the procedure by which patents are en-
forced, as a measure of ensuring public health.8 7 This section also gives the
77. Article 31 (b) of TRIPs states: "This requirement may be waived by a Member in the
case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public
non-commercial use. In situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable." Id.
78. GATT Doc. No. MTN.GNG/NG.1 l/W/70, Art. 27 (May 11, 1990).
79. TRIPs, supra note 63, art. 27.1.
80. Id. art. 31(d); See also Blakeney, supra note 12, at 91.
81. TRIPs, supra note 63, art. 31(d).
82. Article 31 (c) states: "the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose
for which it was authorized ...... Id. art. 31(c).
83. Id. art. 31(g).
84. The History Section of the Medicine Act of 1997 lists the Act of 1965 first.
85. The History section of the Medicine Act of 1997 repeals the Medicine Act of 1965,
1976, 1978, 1979, and 1981 in whole, and the sections 1 through 22 of the 1991 Act. See supra
note 2.
86. Article 15C of the Medicine Act of 1997 states: "The Minister may prescribe conditions
for the supply of more affordable medicines in certain circumstances so as to protect the health
of the public." Id. art. 15C.
87. Id.
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Minister the right to allow other countries to import generic versions of pat-
ented drugs into the country.1
8
Article 22C of the Medicine Act of 1997 governs the compulsory licens-
ing of drugs in South Africa. 89 The Medicine Act of 1997 gives the South
African government the right to issue compulsory licenses to local manufac-
turers "upon such conditions as to the application of such acceptable quality
assurance principles and good manufacturing and distribution practices as the
council may determine." 90
The Medicine Act also establishes a Pricing Committee, appointed by the
Minister of Health, whose main function is to recommend drug prices to the
Minister.9 ' Moreover, the Pricing Committee determines a uniform price for
medicine sold by South African manufacturers.
92
2. South African Medicines and Medical Devices Regulatory Act
The South African government passed SAMMDRA in response to world-
wide opposition to the Medicine Act. SAMMDRA established a regulatory
body to accept medical patent registration, 93 and the Act permits the regula-
tory body to authorize the sale of unregistered medicines. 94 The original draft
of SAMMDRA repealed Article 15C of the Medicine Act.95 However, the
South African parliament reinstated the Article. 96 In fact, SAMMDRA re-
pealed the Medicine Act in whole, but expressly retains sections 15 and 22, the
main source of controversy.
97
Neither the Medicine Act nor SAMMDRA expressly convey that AIDS
drugs are the only drugs applicable to compulsory licensing.98 Given the
amount of money the patent holders stand to lose, however, and the amount of
HIV infected people in South Africa, it is inferable that compulsory licensing
of AIDS drugs is the primary focus of international opposition.
88. Id.
89. Id. art. 22(C).
90. Article 22C (1)(b) of the Medicine Act of 1997 states: "the council may, on application
in the prescribed manner and on payment of the prescribed fee, issue to a manufacturer, whole-
saler or distributor of a medicine or medical device a license to manufacture, act as a wholesaler
of or distribute, as the case may be, such medicine or medical device . I..." ld. art. 22C (l)(b).
91. Id. art. 22G(1).
92. Id. art. 22G(3)(a).
93. South African Medicines And Medical Devices Regulatory Authority Act No. 132 OF
1998, 1998 SA HEALTH 132, § 24(2)(b) [hereinafter SAMMDRA].
94. Id. § 30.
95. PhRMA, supra note 7.
96. Id.
97. The History section of SAMMDRA says that the Medicine Act of 1978 was repealed in
whole, but the 1965 and 1997 versions retained sections 1, 15, 22 in common. See supra note
93.
98. In both the Medicine Act of 1997 and SAMMDRA the object is referred to as
"medicines" instead of AIDS medicines or AIDS drugs.
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B. U.S. Patent Law Compared
In order to receive a patent on any invention in the United States, the
invention must be useful, novel99 and non-obvious to a reasonably skilled per-
son in the field of the invention. o South African patent law prescribes those
same requirements. 101
The one major difference between the patent laws of both countries is in
the licensing scheme. Instead of compulsory licensing, U.S. patent law
utilizes a reasonable royalty scheme. This licensing scheme is a measure of
damages to compensate for the infringement of a patent. 10 2 The reasonable
rate can be determined by a jury or the court, and the court has the right to
increase the determined rate up to three times. 10 3 This is much different from
the aforementioned failure to work provisions of past compulsory licensing
schemes for international patents. The reasonable royalty is also different
from Section 22C of the Medicine Act, which gives the Minister of Health and
the Pricing Committee the right to determine royalty rates for non- infringe-
ment purposes of compulsory licensing.
C. AIDS Crisis in South Africa
The South African AIDS crisis has reached epidemic proportions. For
instance, in 1999 it was estimated that 30 percent of the young adults are HIV
positive. 10 4 Researchers estimated that if South African conditions did not
improve immediately, 45 percent of the pregnant population will be HIV in-
fected by the year 2000.105 Moreover, HIV infections were estimated to be
increasing at a rate of 1,500 a day.1°6 The total infected population was esti-
mated at 3.6 million. 10
7
South African rape figures are equally astounding. 10 8 South African rape
incidences are among the highest in the world.' °9 The rape crisis is so troub-
ling that CGU Insurance, a South African insurance company, has recently
99. See 35 U.S.C.S. § 101 (2000).
100. See id. § 103.
101. See 1978 SA COMMERCIAL LAW 57, Patents Act. No. 57 of 1978.
102. See supra note 99 § 284.
103. Id.
104. Dean Baker, The Real Drug Crisis, INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, IN THESE TIMES,
Aug. 22, 1999, at 19.
105. This figure is quoted from the second Global Strategies for the Prevention of HIV
Transmission from Mothers to Infants Conference in Montreal, held from September 1 through
5, 1999. One Million Additional Infants Will Be Infected With HIV by 2003 if Prevention Mea-
sures Not Taken, Announces Global AIDS Conference in Montreal, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 1,
1999.
106. Envoy Says U.S. Not A "Puppet" Of Drug Companies, AIDS WEEKLY PLUS, Aug. 16,
1999.
107. Activists Lock Gore Out of His Office, Criticizing SA Drug Deal, AFRICA NEWS SER-
VICE, BRC-NEws, Aug. 25, 1999.
108. Charlene Smith, Employing the Profit Motive to Combat Rape, FINANCIAL MAIL
(South Africa), Oct. 22, 1999, at 24.
109. Id.
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launched a rape insurance policy to offer medical and psychological treatment
to rape victims. 10 Estimates put South African rape statistics at a million per
year, and one of three women in their lifetime will be raped. " ' I One can easily
infer that the rape situation worsens an already unbearable AIDS epidemic in
South Africa.
If these grave conditions persist the South African population is in danger
of becoming extinct. With a low per capita income, 1 2 and a rising incidence
of HIV infection, one can infer that the main reason for widespread opposition
to the passage of the Medicine Act and SAMMDRA is the amount of money
that pharmaceutical companies stand to lose.
It is well known that pharmaceutical companies depend on research to
survive in a highly competitive market.' 13 Patent protection and research
budgets are often incorporated into the price of the drugs sold. 114 It is esti-
mated, however, that nearly a third of the 20 billion dollars spent annually on
pharmaceutical research is spent on "copycat drugs"."l 5 "Copy cat" drugs are
produced when a company has secured a patent on a particular drug, and its
competitors subsequently rush to capitalize on the market demand for said
drugs by reproducing a comparable drug without infringing on the originator's
patent. 16 This practice of allocating corporate earnings toward the evasion of
patents costs billions, yet compulsory licensing, a cheaper alternative, is the
focus of conflict.
IV. TRIPs AND OPPOSITION To THE MEDICINE ACT
A. International Opposition
1. South African Opposition
South Africa's attempt to secure cheaper drug prices has sparked world-
wide controversy. In 1997 the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of
South Africa (PMA) filed suit against the South African government to sus-
pend the Medicine Act.' 17 After SAMMDRA was passed, the suit focused on
repealing SAMMDRA.118
110. South African Insurance Company Launches Policy for Rape Victims, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Oct. 13, 1999.
111. See id. This estimate is quoted from Rape Crisis, a South African non-governmental
organization.
112. South Africa presently has a per capita Gross Domestic Product of three thousand dol-
lars a year. See Ethel Hazelhurst, Time to Say: I Want You, FINANCIAL MAIL (South Africa),
March 24, 2000, at 50.




117. Chenault, supra note 1. I have repeatedly tried to contact Miryenna Deeb, the CEO of
the PMA to obtain a copy of the complaint, but all attempts have been unsuccessful.
118. Since SAMMDRA repealed the Medicine Act of 1997, this is inferred.
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On September 9, 1999, PMA suspended their lawsuit against the South
African government' 19 because the South African Minister of Health agreed to
redraft the Medicine Act and SAMMDRA in early 2000 to correct the "flaws"
in these regulations. ' 20 Interestingly, the South African Department of Health
asserts that their review of SAMMDRA is not due to any pressure from
PMA's lawsuit. 121 The Minister of Health states that the decision is merely a
result of internal discussions among the Department of Health, 122 and that the
Medicine Act of 1997 is not up for review. 123 The press release further stated
that the South African government is still in the process of implementing a
legal strategy to defend itself against the allegations of the PMA.
124
Mirryena Deeb, the chief executive of PMA, recently suggested that the
South African government should use government funds to procure cheaper
AIDS medication. 125 Ms. Deeb contends that with the aid of the State Tender
System, through which the state buys 80% of all medicines, AIDS medicines
can be purchased at prices lower than international aid organizations
charge. 126 The plausibility of this recommendation, however, is questionable
given the number of people suffering from AIDS. If there is enough capital in
the State Tender to purchase AIDS medication for 3.5 million patients, then
Ms. Deed's argument is with merit. If this is not the case, however, then how
would the government choose who is eligible for treatment? Would the medi-
cation be rationed, or auctioned? If the solution cannot be applied to the entire
infected population, the Medicine Act is a better option, provided that it is
legal.
In March 2001, the PMA finally reinitiated the lawsuit in the South Afri-
can High Court. Judge Bernard Ngoepe continued the confusion, however, by
halting the trial. Judge Ngoepe questions the standing of the PMA to pursue
this case, specifically questioning how a law that "was never put into effect
and hence has no chance to cause harm" can be contested.
2 7
119. Drug Companies Suspend Action Against South Africa, PhRMA News Releases &
Statements, at http://www.phrma.org/news/9-9-99.html (last visited Nov. 11, 1999).
120. Id. PhRMA asserts that the Minister agreed to redraft the laws because compulsory
licensing and parallel importing is inconsistent with "South Africa's international obligations."
121. Press Release, South African Department of Health, Litigation Between the Pharmaceu-
tical Manufacturers Association of SA and the Government of South Africa Regarding Act 90





125. S. African Govt Should Use State Tender to Get Best Prices for HIVIAIDS Drugs: PMA,
MARKiTLrrER, (London, UK), Oct. 4, 1999.
126. Id.
127. Henri E. Cauvin, Trial in AIDS Drug Lawsuit Opens in Pretoria, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
2001, at A8.
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2. United States' Opposition
The United States has taken a different approach in voicing its objection
to SAMMDRA and the Medicine Act. 128 On April 30, 1988, the United States
Traded Representative, Charlene Barshefsky, placed South Africa on its 301
Watch List of countries that fail to give adequate protection to international
patents. 29 As stated earlier, international patent regulation has shifted from
an intellectual property issue to a trade issue.
130
At least part of the USTR's decision was a direct result of political influ-
ence.13 1 In fact, New Jersey Congressman Rodney Frelinghuysen is a staunch
supporter of the pharmaceutical industry's efforts to repeal the Medicine
Act. 132 Upon being placed on 301 Watch List, South Africa became suscepti-
ble to trade sanctions, which would further damage an already impoverished
economy, thus making it more difficult to combat the AIDS crisis.
133
On September 17, 1999, however, the USTR, through its Council of the
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, reached an agreement with the
South African government regarding the Medicine Act and SAMMDRA.
134
The agreement between both countries expresses their desire to be committed
to TRIPs regarding this issue. 135 Part of the agreement entails South Africa's
enactment of a new law that complies with TRIPs.136 The provisions of this
agreement are confusing and vague because under both a broad and narrow
reading of TRIPs, the Medicine Act and SMMDRA already comply with its
provisions.
128. Instead of suing in international court, the United States Trade Representative
threatened South Africa with trade sanctions.
129. Medicine Act of 1997, supra note 85, art. 15(c).
130. For example, the World Intellectual Property Organization used to be the primary
source of patent regulation, but the power has shifted to the World Trade Organization, which
was established by the GATT, another international trade organization.
131. At the time of the USTR's decision, New Jersey Congressman Rodney Frelinghuysen
introduced a provision in the Foreign Operations Bill to discontinue all aid to South Africa until
South Africa repealed the Medicine Act. See Vulliamy, supra note 17.
132. Bristol Myers is based in New Jersey. See id.
133. PhRMA, supra note 11.
134. Office of the United States Trade Representative Press Release, US-South Africa Un-
derstanding on Intellectual Property (Sept. 17, 1999), available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/
1999/09/99-76.html.
135. The South African Department of Trade and Industry Press Release states: "This is
premised on the commitment of both Governments to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, as well as
an appreciation of the South African Government's efforts to provide affordable health care to
its people." See Department of Trade and Industry Press Release, JOINT UNDERSTANDING BE-
TWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Sept. 17,
1999; The United States Trade Representative Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky stated that:
"The United States very much appreciates South Africa's assurance that, as it moves vigorously
forward to bring improved health care to its citizens, it will do so in a manner consistent with
international commitments and that fully protects intellectual property rights". Id.
136. Myers, supra note 19.
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On May 10, 2000, former President Clinton further halted any 301 activ-
ity by the USTR. Clinton accomplished this by executing an Executive Order
that forbids the United States from using trade sanctions or negotiations to
alter the laws of any Sub-Saharan African country, as long as the law was
enacted to supply drugs to those infected with the AIDS virus. In order to
receive protection, the laws must also comply with the TRIPs Agreement.
37
B. TRIPs Provisions that validate SAMMDRA and the Medicine Act
There are many provisions in TRIPs that give the South African govern-
ment the right to issue compulsory licenses for AIDS drugs. 138 Article 27.3 of
TRIPs allows exceptions for drug and therapeutic treatment of animals and
humans. 139 Surely, compulsory licensing of drugs, especially AIDS drugs, is
instrumental to the therapeutic treatment of humans.
Article 27.2 allows compulsory licensing for inventions deemed neces-
sary to protect human lives.' 40 Indeed, there could not be a TRIPs provision
more in line with the goals of the South African government to issue compul-
sory licenses to manufacturers to produce AIDS drugs. This article alone
should silence the critics of the Medicine Act and SAMMDRA who feel that
the two regulations are a direct violation of TRIPs. Furthermore, under a
broad reading of TRIPs one can also validate the Medicine Act and SAMM-
DRA under Article 8.1, which allows grants to promote public health.' 4 '
Due to the amount of HIV-infected individuals in South Africa, the gov-
ernment can classify the AIDS epidemic as a national emergency, which
would further validate the Medicine Act and SAMMDRA.142 As stated ear-
lier, Article 31(c) of TRIPs gives member nations the right to grant compul-
sory licenses in cases of national emergencies. 143 In fact, the World Health
Organization has urged all African governments to declare the AIDS crisis a
national emergency, which further validates the magnitude of the South Afri-
can AIDS crisis. 44
In addition, according to Section 34(1) of the South African Constitution,
the South African Parliament is within its rights to declare the AIDS crisis a
137. Exec. Order No. 13155, 65 FED. REG. 30, 521 (May 10, 2000).
138. TRIPs, supra note 63, arts. 8.1, 27.2, 27.3, and 31.
139. TRIPs, supra note 63, art. 27.3.
140. TRIPs, art. 27.2 states: "Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the pre-
vention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect
public order or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health to avoid
serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because
the exploitation is prohibited by domestic law."
141. TRIPS, supra note 63, art. 8.1.
142. Article 31 of TRIPs makes it clear that one can issue compulsory licenses in times of
national emergency. Id. art. 31.
143. See id.
144. In Brief-News, BustNEss DAY (South Africa), June 24, 1999, (News Section), at 1.
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national emergency. 145 If one looks at the legislative history behind Article
31(c) of TRIPs, it was the United States that suggested the insertion of this
provision. This is ironic, considering that the United States is one of the big-
gest critics of the South African drug patent laws. 146 Therefore, in order to
comply with the national emergency requirement of Article 31(c), the South
African government must redraft SAMMDRA to state that compulsory licens-
ing will only be used for AIDS drugs, and not aspirins or cough medicine. 1
47
Since many other diseases stem from HIV, the law can also be rewritten to
state that compulsory licenses of medication will only be granted under cir-
cumstances of national emergency.
C. International Support of Compulsory Licensing of AIDS Drugs
In the United States, the Consumer Project on Technology, created by
Ralph Nader and presently run by James Love, has been instrumental in ex-
posing TRIPs provisions, and other instances of compulsory licensing that val-
idate Article 15C of the Medicine Act. 1
48
Thailand, a Third World country in its own right, has been under fire for
its compulsory licensing practices, particularly of AIDS drugs. 14 9 In fact,
Bristol Myers, patent holder of the AIDS drug ddl, recently rejected Thai-
land's attempt to issue a compulsory license for the production of ddl at a fifty
percent discount of Bristol's price.1 50 Dr. Tido von Schoen-Angerer, of
Medicines Sans Frontiers (Doctors Without Borders), an advocate group
favoring compulsory licensing of AIDS drugs, stated that the Thai movement
to produce ddl is with merit because U.S. scientists at the National Institute of
Health created the drug. 151 In effect, this means that Bristol Myers, a large
conglomerate, is the beneficiary of a compulsory license itself, yet refuses to
grant a compulsory license to a third world nation in need of remedying a
national crisis.
UNAIDS, a joint effort of UNICEF, the World Health Organization, and
other international organizations, 152 also supports compulsory licensing of
145. Section 34(1) of the South African Constitution states: "A state of emergency shall be
proclaimed prospectively under an Act of Parliament, and shall be declared only where the
security of the Republic is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection or disorder or at a
time of national disaster, and if declaration of a state emergency is necessary to restore peace
and order."
146. Vulliamy, supra note 17.
147. PhRMA, supra note 7.
148. The Consumer Project on Technology was created by Ralph Nader, a worldwide recog-
nized leader in consumer advocacy. See Sabin Russell, World Trade Showdown; Activists, In-
dustry Split Over AIDS Drugs, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 24, 1999, at Al.
149. Thailand/USA disputes regarding compulsory licensing and AIDS drugs. Letter from
James Love, Consumer Project on Technology to Thomas M. Rosshirt, Spokesman for the Vice
President, (Jan. 22, 2000) at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/thailand/tmr.
150. See Russell, supra note 148.
151. Id.
152. Myers, supra note 19.
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AIDS drugs based on the TRIPs Agreement. 53 In fact, a recent study by
UNAIDS shows that most AIDS drugs are not patented in developed coun-
tries. 154 For example, Stavudine (d4T) is only patented in Egypt, South Af-
rica, and the Philippines.1 55 Moreover, Indinavir, is only patented in South
Africa.156 It is easily inferable, that these drug manufacturers applied for pat-
ents in South Africa solely because of the potential for financial reward. Fur-
ther investigation by UNAIDS shows that developed countries have until 2006
to adopt legislation implementing the TRIPs agreement. 157 In light of this
information, even if the Medicine Act did violate the provisions of TRIPs, the
law would still be valid until 2006.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the devastating conditions that AIDS has caused in South Af-
rica, and South Africa's inability to purchase AIDS drugs, the Medicine Act
and SAMMDRA comply with TRIPs under both narrow and broad interpreta-
tions of the agreement. The drafters of TRIPs should have written the agree-
ment more narrowly if they were truly afraid of Third World nations issuing
compulsory licenses for the production of AIDS drugs. Given the history of
international patent legislation, the intent of the framers appears to be the es-
tablishment of greater restrictive conditions for compulsory licensing than
those of the Paris and Hague Conventions. As written, however, any TRIPs
member experiencing a major health crisis can issue compulsory licenses, or
more drastically, simply ignore international patents under Article 27.2, which
allows compulsory licensing for inventions necessary to protect human
lives. 158
If TRIPs is interpreted broadly, the Medicine Act and SAMMDRA com-
ply based on Article 27.2. Under a broad interpretation, the South African
medical patent laws also comply under Article 8.1, which allows grants to
promote public health.1 5
9
Alternatively, for the Medicine Act and SAMMDRA to survive under a
narrow interpretation of TRIPs, South Africa must declare their AIDS crisis a
153. The UNAIDS Secretariat has publicly stated that they support: "1) Preferential pricing
of HIV/AIDS goods, including male and female condoms, and HIV/AIDS drugs and other phar-
maceutical products, so that these products are priced affordably at levels consistent with local
purchasing power . . . ; 4). . . that recourse to compulsory licensing may be necessary, as
provided for under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs), such as in countries where HIV/AIDS constitutes a national emergency." See J. Per-
riens, M.D., Compulsory Licensing and Access to HIV Drugs, Address Before the Paris 1999






158. See South African Department of Health, supra note 121.
159. Id.
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national emergency to fit under Article 31. Furthermore, they must rewrite
their laws to indicate that the government would only issue compulsory li-
censes for the production of AIDS drugs. Under the current laws, South Af-
rica could issue compulsory licenses to reproduce aspirin, cough medicine, or
other drugs. If the Medicine Act and SAMMDRA are rewritten to say that
compulsory licenses will only be granted in times of national emergency, and
for drugs capable of curing life threatening illnesses, they should be able to
survive any attack.
Patrick Marc

